While the killing of Baitullah Mehsud led to immediate retaliatory attacks, in the long run it could lead to a weakening of the TTP.

Maulana Waliur Rahman couldn’t become the amir, or head, of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) following the death of Baitullah Mehsud, but he did manage to grab arguably the most powerful job in the banned organisation. As the amir of the TTP in South Waziristan, he controls the resources and fighters in the organisation’s birthplace and stronghold. In a way, the new TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud would be dependent on him for money and manpower.

Before his rise to the top of TTP, Hakimullah Mehsud controlled hundreds of fighters from his base in Orakzai Agency. His men were responsible for all the attacks on Afghanistan-bound trucks carrying supplies for NATO forces via Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. Among his prized possessions was an American Humvee vehicle that the Taliban militants had snatched during a raid on a NATO supply convoy in Khyber Agency.

The swift ascendancy of Baitullah Mehsud was due to more than his willingness to wage violent jihad: he was a strategic leader with charm.

Ayesha Siddiqa profiles four militant organisations operating in South Punjab, who allegedly have a nexus with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Once ubiquitous in every field, Zoroastrians in Pakistan now face dwindling numbers, as the vast majority of the youth move away.

Zahid Hussain meets some potential suicide bombers who were captured during the army operation in Swat.

The most touching speech was by a young student and member of WAF, Wardha Ishaque, who said that the youth of today are being deprived of all that their parents enjoyed in the ’70s, for instance, cinema and the arts, literature and poetry, and how demeaning it is when girls are forbidden from sitting with their male colleagues in schools.

It is unwise to put deadlines on military campaigns against hardened hoodlums, especially if they are heavily funded, marvelously trained in guerilla warfare, and what is more, are driven by a fanatical sense of religious commitment to the cause of mayhem and murder. The army high command, acutely aware of the public perception of them playing ducks and drakes with opportunities to root out the Taliban, claims that the goal of the operation is very clear: kill the Taliban and wrest this slice of Pakistan’s territory back from their control. But the eventual success of the plan might hinge on factors beyond the control of the army.

Apart from a provincial recovery plan being prepared by the NWFP government, the federal government and the Pakistan Army too, would be expected to shoulder responsibility for putting in place infrastructural services before the IDPs start returning to their native areas. It is felt that the majority of the IDPs may rush back to their villages and towns once they realise that there is no fighting in their area.